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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

Case No. 960227-CA

v.
Priority No. 2
RANDY J. MONTOYA,

:

Defendant-Appellant.

:

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Randy J. Montoya appeals his conviction for unlawful
possession of a controlled substance (heroin), Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996), a third
degree felony, entered by the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, the
Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, presiding. This Court has appellate jurisdiction under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1996).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1. Did the trial court correctly deny Montoya's motion to suppress physical
evidence found in the passenger compartment and trunk of an automobile under his
control, following Montoya's arrest for public intoxication?

2. Did the trial court correctly deny Montoya's motion to suppress his
admission to heroin use, made in response to a postarrest, police question posed before
"Miranda" warnings were administered?
A "bifurcated" appellate review standard applies for each issue: Underlying
fact findings are reviewed deferentially, and reversed only for "clear error." The court's
conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness, with a "measure of deference" accorded
to highly fact-sensitive conclusions. See State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah
1994); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1265-71 (Utah 1993).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
This case involves the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution,
which states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
This case also implicates the privilege against compelled self-incrimination, set forth in
the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution ("nor shall [an accused] be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself).

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Montoya was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance
(heroin), a third degree felony, unlawful possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B
misdemeanor, and with public intoxication, a class C misdemeanor (R. 5-6). He moved
to suppress paraphernalia and heroin seized from an automobile in his control at the time
of his arrest, contending that police illegally searched the automobile. He also moved to
suppress statements made by him when arrested, contending that the statements arose
during interrogation that had not been preceded by the warnings mandated in Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (R. 20-31). After a hearing, review of a defense
memorandum, and argument, the trial court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law, denying the motion to suppress (R. 50-54, copied in the appendix to this brief).
Montoya then entered a conditional guilty plea to the controlled substance
charge, reserving, under Utah R. Crim. P. 1 l(i) and State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah
App. 1988), the right to appeal the denial of his motions to suppress (R. 42). The
paraphernalia and intoxication charges were dismissed (R. 48, 55). He was sentenced to a
term of zero to five years at the Utah State Prison, said sentence to run concurrently with
a sentence imposed for a prior offense (R. 55). Montoya's appeal was dismissed for
failure to timely file a notice of appeal, but was reinstated via sentencing nunc pro tunc
and a new notice of appeal (R. 169-76,184-85).

3

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The State recites the facts in a light supporting the trial court's denial of
Montoya's motion to suppress. See, e.g., State v. Troyer, 910 P.2d 1182,1186 (Utah
1995). At about 3 A.M. on a summer night, West Valley City Police officers Gill and
Schmidt answered a call from a Seven-Eleven convenience store, complaining of "an
unknown individual out front bothering customers, walking around in his underwear" (R.
50, 95). They encountered Montoya infrontof the store, "wearing only boxer shorts and
sandals. He was walking about in a nervous manner. His movements were 'jerky.' His
behavior was erratic. He was talking to himself (R. 51, 96). Gill asked Montoya "if he
was on any medication or anything." Montoya responded "that he had a few beers and
had smoked a joint" (R. 96).
Generally, Montoya was poorly responsive to Officer Gill's questions, often
giving answers not related to the questions (R. 96). Officer Schmidt observed that
Montoya "appeared intoxicated. He seemed more extreme than that. That's why I wasn't
sure what he might have been under the influence of because after he said he was on
alcohol and also possibly some marijuana, he was acting a little bit more strange than
that, that I've seen" (R. 121). Montoya's behavior became more erratic as Officer Gill
spoke with him (R. 96).
Based upon Montoya's worsening condition, Officer Gill arrested him for
public intoxication; Gill also decided to summon medical assistance to evaluate Montoya
4

(R. 51, 97,125-26). Gill handcuffed Montoya, seated him in a police cruiser, and radioed
for medical assistance (R. 51,97). Gill also radioed for assistance from another officer,
McCarthy, who "was a little more educated on different types of effects of controlled
substances or what might be going on with Mr. Montoya" (R. 97-98, 51).
Officer McCarthy arrived promptly (R. 107). McCarthy knew and
recognized Montoya, and 'talked to him to see if he was allright"(R. 107). McCarthy
observed that Montoya "had foaming of the mouth. He was real jittery. His eyes were
dilated and I asked him point-blank, and also he had marks on him to show that he had
been intravenously ingesting something, so I asked him — street term. I asked him if he
was doing some cheve. He stated he was, which is a street term for heroin" (R. 108, 51).
Montoya also told McCarthy that "he was going to overdose" (R. 118). McCarthy did not
administer "Miranda" warnings prior to thus questioning Montoya, explaining that his
questions had been related to Montoya's intoxicated medical condition (R. 114,118).
The officers then turned their attention to the Mitsubishi automobile that
Montoya had driven to the Seven-Eleven. As related by Officer Gill, "Policy states that
we impound vehicles for driver arrests, city impound which I was going to do" (R. 98).
Per their procedure, Gill and Schmidt began "an inventory of all items in the vehicle" (R.
98); however, they "did not use an inventory or impound form" (R. 51, 104). In the
Mitsubishi's passenger compartment, Officer Gill found "money was thrown everywhere.
Dollars were scattered on the floor and when I reached in the passenger side, I saw a
5

syringe and a spoon sticking - stuck in between the center console and the passenger seat
and when I saw this, it caught my eye. It's commonly used paraphernalia for different
sorts of ingestion of different types of controlled substances" (R. 98-99).
After assessing Montoya's condition, and while efforts were being made to
identify the Mitsubishi's owner, Officer McCarthy assisted with the inventory search (R.
108). McCarthy examined the spoon and syringe, and determined that they carried a
"familiar" odor-evidently of narcotics (R. 109). In the Mitsubishi's trunk, McCarthy
found "a small little container. I can't remember what it was, but there were five balloons
with aluminum foil" (R. 109). Based upon his past experience as a narcotics officer,
McCarthy determined that the balloons contained black tar heroin (R. 109).
Meanwhile, the Mitsubishi's owner had been identified: it belonged to
Montoya's girlfriend, whom McCarthy knew (R. 23, 52, 109-10,115). Accordingly, in
his authority as patrol supervisor that night, McCarthy decided that rather than towing the
Mitsubishi to an impound lot, he would attempt to return it to the owner (R. 110-11).
Besides being driven by a desire to avoid expense and inconvenience to the owner,
McCarthy's decision was based upon the fact that the Mitsubishi carried a large lien, and
therefore was not a vehicle for which the State would pursue forfeiture (R. 52,117). This
decision was made after the heroin had been found (R. 52). With considerable difficulty,
McCarthy eventually found Montoya's girlfriend, and helped her to retrieve her
Mitsubishi (R. 115-16).
6

Montoya was taken to a hospital, and treated for his heroin intoxication (R.
136). His prosecution and motion to suppress ensued, as already described. Montoya
now appeals, challenging the denial of his motion to suppress.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The Mitsubishi was properly subjected to an inventory search incident to
its impoundment. A noninvestigatory purpose supported the impoundment, the search
was conducted according to police policy, and no "pretext" analysis should apply to
invalidate such an otherwise lawful search. The fact that officers eventually returned the
Mitsubishi to its owner does not change this result. Alternatively, the vehicle's interior
was properly searched incident to Montoya's arrest, and the entire vehicle was properly
searched based upon probable cause and exigent circumstances. Montoya's intoxicated
condition and admission to heroin use constituted the probable cause. The Mitsubishi's
inherent mobility, plus the need to promptly find the intoxicating substance, constituted
the exigent circumstances supporting the search.
2. Although not recognized by the trial court, Montoya's admission that he
had ingested heroin, made before he was given his "Miranda" warnings, was admissible
under the "public safety" exception to the "Miranda" rule. Under this exception,
announced in the United States Supreme Court's Quarles decision, Miranda warnings are
unnecessary when an officer is conjfronted with an immediate safety risk, and questions a
suspect in an effort to resolve that risk. In this case, an immediate risk was posed by
7

Montoya's deteriorating, intoxicated condition. It was therefore proper for Officer
McCarthy to ask him whether he had ingested heroin, in order to assure prompt, effective
medical treatment. Accordingly, Montoya's admission was not subject to suppression
under the Miranda rule.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED
MONTOYA'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
FOUND IN THE MITSUBISHI
In his first point on appeal, Montoya argues that the trial court erroneously
upheld the search of the Mitsubishi as an "inventory search" incident to the vehicle's
impoundment-^ settled exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. See
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976). The State disagrees. The Mitsubishi
was subjected to a valid inventory search. In addition, the Mitsubishi's interior was
properly searched incident to Montoya's lawful arrest, and the entire vehicle was properly
searched based upon probable cause and exigent circumstances. These latter grounds,
although not addressed by the trial court, may be raised to affirm the trial court's
judgment. State v. South,
A.

P.2d

, 298 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 (Utah 1996).

The Inventory Search of the Entire Vehicle Was Proper.
Montoya challenges the inventory search in three ways. He first argues that

officers had no legitimate basis to impound the Mitsubishi (Br. of Appellant at 21). Next,
8

Montoya argues that the inventory search was improper because it was not proven to be
in conformity with police procedure (id. at 25). Finally, he argues that the search was
unconstitutionally "pretextual" (id. at 33). This Court should reject all three challenges.
1. The Mitsubishi Was Legitimately Subject to Impoundment
Montoya first argues that it was unnecessary to impound the Mitsubishi.
This argument is not preserved by presentation to the trial court, appearing neither in
Montoya's memorandum supporting suppression nor in oral argument of the motion (R.
20-31,139-43). Montoya does not allege "plain error" or any other exception to the rule
that issues thus unpreserved are waived on appeal. See State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,
1208-09 (Utah 1993). Therefore, Montoya's first argument is waived by default.
This argument also fails on its merits, notwithstanding that Montoya finds
support for it in State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985). In Hygh, the Utah Supreme
Court stated that for a vehicle impoundment to be valid, a "reasonable and proper
justification for impoundment of the vehicle" must be demonstrated; such "necessity" for
impoundment must be proven by the State. 711 P.2d at 268. That portion of the Hygh
opinion is no longer an accurate statement of Fourth Amendment law.
Two years after Hygh was issued, the United States Supreme Court held, in
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), that police officers legitimately have discretion
to impound an arrestee's vehicle, "so long as discretion is exercised according to standard
criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion of criminal activity." Id. at
9

375. By that holding, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the claim that before a
vehicle can be impounded, officers must inquire about possible "alternative dispositions"
for the vehicle. See id at 375-76. The "alternative disposition" inquiry is merely another
term for a "necessity of impoundment" inquiry. Therefore, in rejecting an "alternative
disposition" inquiry, the Supreme Court in Bertine effectively held that an impoundment
need not be "necessary" in order to be constitutionally valid.
While courts in other jurisdictions have sometimes held that police must
exhaust alternative dispositions before impounding an automobile, such decisions, like
Hygh, generally predate Bertine. See, e.g., State v. McDaniel, 156 N.J. Super. 347, 35455, 383 A.2d 1174 (1978); 3 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 7.3(c) at 520 n.55
(citing cases) (3rd ed. 1996); see also State v. Rice, 111 P.2d 695 (Utah 1986) (per
curiam).1 Indeed, the Iowa Supreme Court, in light of Bertine, has specifically overruled
its pre-Bertine cases holding that law officers must show "reasonable necessity" for
impoundment. See State v. Aderholt, 545 N.W.2d 559, 564 (Iowa 1996).
In this case, impoundment of the Mitsubishi was proper under Bertine.
First, impoundment was initiated under standardized police criteria. As explained by

x

In Rice, the Utah Supreme Court ordered suppression in an inventory search case
because the police officers in question had no written policy governing such searches, because
the State conceded that officers lacked authority to impound the vehicle, and because "the
impoundment and search were admittedly a pretext concealing an investigatory police motive."
717 P.2d at 696-97. The absence of standard policy, by itself, invalidated the impoundment and
search; the State's concession and the "pretext" conclusion (the latter based upon now-repudiated
"pretext" analysis, see State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994)), amounted to dictum.
10

Officer Gill, "[p]olicy states that we impound vehicles for driver arrests, city impound
which I was going to do" (R. 98). Officer McCarthy had helped to write the West Valley
City impoundment and inventory policy, which he explained as follows: "Any time we
arrest anybody, any time a vehicle's going to be impounded, an inventory will be done,
and if possible, a canine officer will have the dog do a sniff of the vehicle for the
purposes of looking for narcotics" (R. 110-11). This unrebutted testimony established
that the Mitsubishi was impounded pursuant to standard policy.2
2

Montoya miscites the record in an effort to show that policy was not followed in the
impoundment and inventory search (Br. of Appellant at 29). The complete exchange recited by
Montoya, between the prosecutor and Officer McCarthy, was as follows:
Q [(hy prosecutor)] And what is that policy with respect to making inventory
searches of vehicles? In what circumstances is that done?
A [(McCarthy)] Any time we arrest anybody, any time a vehicle's going to be
impounded, an inventory will be done, and if possible, a canine officer will have
the dog do a sniff of the vehicle for purposes of looking for narcotics.
Q And was that policy followed in this instance?
AI think we had calledfor a canine, but they got offat two that morning, so there
wasn 't one available.
Q Now, do you ordinarily make an inventory list in the course of this inventory
search?
A No, if there's something out of place, you would note it. If there was
something of value or something like that, you could take it into custody or you
could give it to the owner. We do have an inventory sheet. I veryfrequentlyuse
it. I just note it in the narrative of the report.
(R. 110-11 (the italicized exchange is omittedfromMontoya's recitation)). The fair
interpretation of McCarthy's testimony is that the impoundment and inventory policy was
followed, with the exception that the canine sniff was not done.
11

Next, the officers in this case had a reason for impounding the Mitsubishi
apartfrom(i.e., in addition to) their desire to search it for narcotics. As the trial court
observed, the vehicle could not be left in the Seven-Eleven parking lot at 3:00 A.M. (R.
53). Such disposition raised ariskthat the Mitsubishi might be damaged or stolen. In
order to adequately prevent such mishap-an accepted justification for impoundment, see
Hygh, 711 P.2d at 267, Strickling, 844 R2d at 986-the officers who arrested Montoya
properly decided to impound the Mitsubishi.
As it happened, Officer McCarthy aborted the impoundment when he
located the Mitsubishi's owner, and returned the vehicle to her (R. 113,115-16).
However, this unusual fact pattern does not compel a different holding with respect to the
police actions taken up to that point. There was, after all, no certainty that McCarthy
would find the vehicle's owner. Had they delayed their impoundment procedures until
the owner was found, the officers risked a claim that the Mitsubishi might be damaged, or
property stolen from it, while it was arguably under their care. Until the owner was
located-achieved only by "extraordinary" effort (R. 115)--the officers were justified in
proceeding with their impoundment procedure, including the inventory search. See State
v. Allen, 817 S.W.2d 526 (Mo. App. 1991) (impoundment and inventory were proper
even though defendant's girlfriend offered to take custody of automobile); People v.
Burch, 188 Cal. App. 3d 172,232 Cal. Rptr. 502 (5th Dist. 1986) (inventory search was
proper even though officers eventually cancelled plan to impound vehicle); United States
12

v. Jamerson, 549 F.2d 1263,1271 (9th Cir. 1977) (inventory search proper before
returning vehicle to its rightful owner).
In other words, what really happened was the officers initiated their
impoundment procedure while simultaneously trying to locate the Mitsubishi's owner.
Had the owner not been located, impoundment would have been completed according to
the police department policy, and would have been proper under the Fourth Amendment.
It would make no sense to penalize the officers for going out of their way to find the
Mitsubishi's owner while also proceeding according to policy. By thus seeking an
alternative to impoundment, the officers were, as already explained, doing more than the
Fourth Amendment requires. Accordingly, their actions were constitutionally reasonable,
and the evidence seized during the inventory search should not be suppressed on the
ground that impoundment was "unnecessary."
2. The Inventory Search Complied with Police Procedure.
Nor can Montoya prevail in his claim that the trial court erroneously found
that the inventory search was performed in compliance with the West Valley City Police
Department's standard procedure (R. 53). As explained above, unrebutted officer
testimony demonstrated the existence of such procedure, which was followed in this case
(R. 98,110-11). It was not necessary, at the hearing on Montoya's motion to suppress, to
introduce copies of the written impoundment policy or written inventory forms in order to
prove the existence of, and compliance with, the applicable policy. See State v.
13

Strickling, 844 P.2d 979,988-990 (Utah App. 1992). Therefore, as in Strickling, 844 P.2d
at 990, the trial court did not commit "clear error" by finding that the inventory search in
this case was conducted "according to procedures" (R. 53).
Montoya makes too much of the fact that the police officers in this case did
not fill out a written inventory form, documenting items found during the inventory
search (R. 104,116, 124; Br. of Appellant at 27-30). He cites no case law holding that
failure to fill out an inventory form, in and of itself, renders an inventory search invalid.
To the contrary, at least one appellate court has rejected that contention. See Carson v.
State, 241 Ga. 622,247 S.E.2d 68, 70 (1978) ("The failure to furnish appellant an
inventory is a ministerial act and does not affect the validity of the search and seizure").
Furthermore, from the officer testimony in this case, it appears that the West Valley
Police impoundment policy does not require completion of an inventory form; instead,
out-of-the-ordinary items found in a vehicle are noted in a standard police report (R. 10406,111,116-17). Additionally, the eventual return of the Mitsubishi to its owner
eliminated the need (if any) to complete an inventory form. Thus the trial court correctly
ruled that "[t]he fact that an inventory sheet was not used was not fatal" (R. 53).
Montoya also complains that the State did not adequately prove that the
West Valley Police impoundment and inventory search procedure is "designed to produce
an inventory," as required in Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1,4 (1990). Specifically, he
notes that the State did not demonstrate that the procedure in this case directs officers to
14

search the trunk, under the spare tire, and inside closed containers-the areas in which the
heroin-containing balloons were found (Br. of Appellant at 33). This complaint also fails.
At the hearing on his motion to suppress, Montoya never questioned
whether the inventory search policy in this case encompassed an automobile's trunk. He
therefore waived this complaint by default. Further, that trial-level default was
reasonable. An automobile's trunk is an obvious area of concern when conducting an
inventory search; valuable items obviously could be kept in the trunk and areas within the
trunk, such as the spare tire well (R. 112-13). By not questioning the trunk search as a
legitimate part of an inventory search, Montoya proceeded in accord with knowledge that
inventory search policies invariably include a search of an automobile's trunk. It would
be an odd inventory policy that included a canine sniff, but did not include inspection of
an automobile's trunk and the opening of closed containers. Even though it would have
been better to more thoroughly describe the inventory search policy in this case, it is
reasonable to infer, on appeal, that the policy in question directed officers to search the
trunk of any impounded automobile. Therefore, the contraband found in the Mitsubishi's
trunk was legitimately seized.
3. No "Pretext Inventory Search " Analysis is Appropriate.
This Court should reject Montoya's claim that the inventory search was
unconstitutionally "pretextual." The Utah Supreme Court has rejected "pretext" analysis
of both roadside detentions, State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994), and of
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warrantless arrests, State v. Harmon, 910 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1995). In Whren v. United
States,

U.S.

, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996), the United States Supreme Court followed

suit with respect to roadside detentions, but left open the possibility that automobile
inventory searches, following impoundment, might be deemed unconstitutionally
"pretextual." 116 S. Ct. at 1773,1774. That possibility was evidently left open because
of dictum in Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), and Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1
(1990) (both discussed in Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1773).
However, the possibility of a "pretext inventory search" analysis is
distinctly out of step with all of the Supreme Court's other Fourth Amendment law,
canvassed in Whren, 116 S. Ct. at 1774, holding that objective actions, rather than
"ulterior" officer motives, are at issue in determining whether police action is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. For the same reasons set forth in Whren and in the Utah
Supreme Court's Lopez decision, 873 P.2d at 1135-38, there is no sound reason to
invalidate an automobile inventory search merely because the officer conducting the
search harbored an "ulterior motive" to uncover evidence of a crime.
Further, in Harmon, the Utah Supreme Court rejected "pretext" doctrine as
applied to full custodial arrests, again explaining that officer motivation has no place in
the question whether an arrest is valid. 910 P.2d at 1204-06. It would be incongruous to
hold that an inventory search of an automobile, which is far less intrusive than a custodial
arrest, can be deemed unconstitutionally "pretextual" simply because the officer was
16

motivated by the desire to find contraband. In short, no "pretext inventory search"
analysis should apply. To the contrary, sound law holds that so long as an inventory
search is conducted in compliance with standardized policy, it is proper under the Fourth
Amendment. See South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 378-81 (1976) (Powell, J.,
concurring); Strickling, 844 P.2d at 987-89. Because the inventory search in this case
was conducted in compliance with the applicable police policy, it was proper. The trial
court's judgment on this point should be affirmed.
B.

The Mitsubishi's Passenger Compartment Was Properly Searched
Incident to Montoya's Arrest.
Even if this Court were to condemn the inventory search, it would not

follow, as Montoya demands, that "all items seized from the vehicle must be suppressed"
(Br. of Appellant at 38). There are alternative grounds upon which the trial court's denial
of Montoya's motion to suppress can be affirmed. As explained in State v. South,
P.2d

, 298 Utah Adv. Rep. 4, 5 (Utah 1996), the "affirm on any proper ground"

principle is a settled principle of appellate review.
In this case, the State raises alternative grounds to affirm the trial court's
judgment that were not raised in the trial court. The court in South stated: "We do not
here address the question of whether an appellee may raise an argument in defense of the
lower court's judgment when that argument was not presented in the lower court." South,
298 Utah Adv. Rep. at 6 n.3. However, in Limb v. Federated Milk Producers Ass % 23
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Utah 2d 222,461 P.2d 290 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court did address that question, and
answered it affirmatively. In Limb, the court held that a trial court judgment can be
affirmed on a ground not argued in the trial court, provided that the record supports such
alternative ground. Limb, 461 P.2d at 293 n.2.3 In this case, there are record-supported
alternative grounds to affirm the trial court's judgment.
The first such alternative ground addresses only the search of the
Mitsubishi's passenger compartment, where the spoon and syringe were found. That
search was proper incident to Montoya's lawful arrest for public intoxication. The scope
of such a search properly extends to the passenger compartment of a recently-occupied
automobile, even if the arrestee has been handcuffed and placed in a police vehicle, as
occurred in this case. See State v. Moreno, 910 P.2d 1245 (Utah App.) (thorough review

3

The cited footnote in Limb addressed Justice Henriod's dissent:

The dissent in this case is without merit. The law is well settled that a trial court should
be affirmed if on the record made it can be. The general law is stated in 5 C.J.S. Appeal
& Error § 1464(1) as follows: "* * * The appellate court will affirm the judgment, order,
or decree appealedfromif it is sustainable on any legal ground or theory apparent on the
record, even though such ground or theory differsfromthat stated by the trial court to be
the basis of its ruling or action, and this is true even though such ground or theory is not
urged or argued on appeal by appellee, was not raised in the lower court, and was not
considered or passed on by the lower court. * * *"
461 P.2d at 203 n.2. The footnote went on to explain that while a judgment can be affirmed on
any proper ground, it will not be reversed on grounds not advanced in the trial court. Id. This
latter rule is tempered, however, by the modem rule of "plain error," State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d
1201,1208 (Utah 1993). The "plain error" rule, which aids appellants, counterbalances the
appellee-aiding "affirm on any ground" rule.
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of "search incident to arrest" cases and authority), cert denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah
1996); see also New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (the leading case).
At the hearing on his motion to suppress, Montoya admitted that he had
driven the Mitsubishi to the Seven-Eleven store (R. 128). Lacking adequate pocket
money to complete his purchase, he went back out to the Mitsubishi to retrieve some
more money (R. 128-29). Just as he got out of the car and was heading back into the
store, Officers Gill and Schmidt arrived (R. 129). Thus the Mitsubishi had been recently
occupied by Montoya when he was arrested, and its passenger compartment was, under
Moreno and its underpinning authority, properly searched incident to Montoya9s arrest.
Therefore, the spoon and syringe seized during that search are admissible evidence,
supporting at least partial affirmance of the trial court's judgment.
C.

The Mitsubishi Was Properly Searched Due to Probable Cause and
Exigent Circumstances.
As the second alternative ground for affirmance, the entire Mitsubishi was

properly searched due to the existence of probable cause to believe that the vehicle
contained contraband, coupled with exigent circumstances. The "probable cause plus
exigent circumstances" search justification is a settled exception to the warrant
requirement. See California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 569 (1991); State v. Anderson,
910 P.2d 1229,1237 (Utah 1996). Both probable cause and exigent circumstances are
determined with respect to the totality of the circumstances, or "mosaic of evidence,"
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known at the time of the search. State v. Ashe, IAS P.2d 1255,1258 (Utah 1987). When
an automobile is searched, the showing of exigent circumstances need not be so strong as
when a home is searched. City of Orem v. Henrie, 868 P.2d 1384,1389 (Utah App.
1994). In this case, the record demonstrates that probable cause and exigent
circumstances existed when the Mitsubishi was searched.
1. Probable Cause.
Probable cause means a "fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found" in the area to be searched. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,238
(1983). Such a "fair probability" was encountered by Officers Gill and Schmidtfromthe
moment they observed Montoya, who appeared intoxicated. Clad only in underwear,
Montoya appeared "nervous," with "jerky" movements and "erratic" behavior, which
included "talking to himself (R. 51,96, 121). His condition was "more extreme" than
the officers typically encountered with a drunken person (R. 121). Montoya gave
unresponsive answers to questions, but did manage to admit "that he had a few beers and
had smoked a joint" (R. 96). Officer McCarthy further noted that Montoya had needle
marks (R. 108). In response to Officer McCarthy's question, Montoya admitted that he
had ingested heroin (R. 108).
Under these circumstances, it arguably would have been irresponsible for
the police officers not to check the Mitsubishi for contraband-particularly, intoxicants.
Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,27-29 (1968) (suspect's unusual behavior justified "stop
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and frisk"). There existed a fair probability that the vehicle contained an open alcohol
container, illicit substances, illicit paraphernalia, or all of these things. Any of such items
would, of course, be evidence of criminal conduct.
Furthermore, because the Mitsubishi's passenger compartment was properly
searched incident to Montoya's arrest, the syringe and spoon found therein add to
probable cause, supporting a search of the entire vehicle. The presence of such
paraphernalia naturally suggests the presence of illicit drugs, which could easily be
secreted anywhere in the vehicle—including the trunk. Furthermore, Montoya was highly
disorganized in his behavior: besides his already-described jitteriness and garbled speech,
he had evidently littered the Mitsubishi's interior with cash (R. 98-99). There was,
therefore, a fair probability that he had placed contraband in the trunk.
2. Exigent Circumstances.
Exigent circumstances existed under the traditional concern that an
automobile's inherent mobility poses a risk that evidence will be lost if a search is not
promptly conducted. Hence, an entire automobile may be searched, either immediately or
later, without a warrant. See Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 569-70. Such exigency existed in this
case, because the Mitsubishi was surely going to be moved from the Seven-Eleven storeif not by the police, then by its owner. Thus had the search not been conducted, the
evidence contained in the vehicle would have been lost.
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The unique circumstances of this case also gave rise to another type of
exigency. When encountered by Officers Gill and Schmidt, Montoya's intoxication was
of a nature unusual to the officers-that is, beyond what they expected from Montoya's
admission to beer and marijuana use. Further, his condition appeared to be worsening, to
such a degree that the officers specially called for medical help (R. 51,96-97,125-26).4
Montoya had needle marks on his arm, and admitted heroin ingestion; Montoya also told
Officer McCarthy that "he was going to overdose" (R. 108,118).
Thus faced with what objectively appeared to be a medical emergency, the
police officers were justified in promptly searching the Mitsubishi, in order to find and
confirm the identity of the substance or substances that caused Montoya's unusual
intoxication, and that might also be used for a self-destructive overdose. It was also
possible that such search might reveal evidence of a medical ailment or treatment that
contributed to Montoya's condition. Such information could prove valuable (perhaps
lifesaving) to the medical personnel who would be called upon to assist Montoya.
Finally, the officers were duty-bound to find whatever intoxicating substance might be in
the Mitsubishi, to prevent anybody else from ingesting it. See New York v. Quarles, 467
U.S. 649, 657 (1984) (prompt search for hidden gun was justified in part by concern for
public safety).

4

The summoned medical help was in addition to the assistance soughtfromOfficer
McCarthy. However,firemen,rather than paramedics, were dispatched to the scene (R. 118-19).
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In other words, a "community caretaking" obligation, similar to that
endorsed by this Court in Provo City v. Warden, 844 P.2d 360 (Utah App. 1992), ajfd,
875 P.2d 557 (Utah 1994), justified the Mitsubishi's prompt search (perhaps even
independently of probable cause). In Warden, involving the stop of a driver who had
threatened suicide, this Court adopted a "community caretaking" justification for
detentions under the Fourth Amendment. A similar justification should apply to searches.
In particular, "circumstances threatening life or safety," which justify a detention under
Warden, 844 P.2d at 363, should also be deemed to justify a search.5 In this case, as just
explained, such circumstances were present: Montoya was in a deteriorating intoxicated
condition, and spoke about "overdosing."
Accordingly, in addition to the exigency posed by the Mitsubishi's
mobility, the officers' community caretaking responsibility in this case justified their
prompt search of the vehicle. Coupled with probable cause to believe that the vehicle
contained contraband, these exigent circumstances supported the search. For this

5

In Warden, this Court established a three-part test to assess whether a detention is proper
under the "community caretaking" exception to the warrant requirement: (1) Did a Fourth
Amendment "seizure" occur? (2) Was the seizure "in pursuit of a bona fide community caretaker
function" that a "reasonable officer" would have pursued? (3) Did the circumstances objectively
"demonstrate an imminent danger to life or limb?" 844 P.2d at 364. Parts (1) and (2) can be
adapted to a search by substituting the word "search" for "seizure," although part (2) may be a
dead letter, for it was based upon "pretext" analysis developed by this Court in State v. Lopez,
831 P.2d 1040 (Utah App. 1992), which was subsequently rejected by the Utah Supreme Court,
State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127 (Utah 1994).
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alternative reason, the trial court's judgment, denying Montoya's motion to suppress the
physical evidence, should be affirmed.
POINT TWO
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED MONTOYA'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS INCRIMINATING
STATEMENT TO OFFICER MCCARTHY
Montoya next argues that his postarrest admission to Officer McCarthy, that
he had ingested heroin, should have been suppressed because that admission was made
before Montoya was apprised of his "Miranda" rights.6 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966) (in-custody suspect must be apprised of, and waive, his counsel and silence
rights before interrogation may proceed). This argument also fails. The trial court
correctly denied Montoya's motion to suppress his admission, albeit for a different reason
than that identified by the court. See State v. South,

P.2d

, 298 Utah Adv. Rep. 4,

5 (Utah 1996) (discussed in Point One, pages 17-18 of this brief).
The record suggests that Montoya was read his "Miranda" warnings at
some point (R. 105, Br. of Appellant at 43), but does not indicate whether this was done
prior to, or after, Officer McCarthy "asked him if he was doing some cheve [(heroin)]"
(R. 108). McCarthy admitted that he did not administer "Miranda" warnings because his
intention in questioning Montoya was not criminal interrogation, but to assess his medical

6

In the trial court, Montoya also urged suppression of hisprearrest admission that he had
consumed beer and marijuana (R. 25). He does not pursue that argument on appeal.
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condition (R. 118). The trial court ruled that "[t]here were no incriminating statements
made after [Montoya's] arrest" (R. 53).
The record does not support that ruling. The court found that Officers Gill
and Schmidt arrested and handcuffed Montoya before Officer McCarthy arrived (R. 51),
and there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of that finding. Normally under such
circumstances, "Miranda" warnings were required before Montoya could be interrogated.
The trial court made no finding that Montoya was so warned before McCarthy asked
whether he had ingested heroin; indeed, the court appears to have tacitly found that
Montoya was not warned under Miranda (R. 144, referring to "fact or failure to
Mirandize the defendant"). Thus normally, Montoya's admission would have been
suppressed under the Miranda rule.
But McCarthy's question to Montoya was proper, and Montoya's response
admissible, under the common sense-based "public safety" exception to the Miranda
requirement, established in New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984). In Quarles, a
police officer apprehended a suspected armed rapist inside a store. Discovering that the
suspect was wearing an empty holster, the officer handcuffed him and asked the suspect
where the gun was. Stating, "the gun is over there," the suspect directed the officer to a
nearby carton, from which a pistol was retrieved. Only then did the officer read the
suspect his Miranda warning. 467 U.S. at 652.
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The Supreme Court held that both the pistol and the statement "the gun is
over there" were admissible at trial, crafting "a narrow exception to the Miranda rule"
based upon the need to protect public safety:
We conclude that the need for answers to questions in a
situation posing a threat to public safety outweighs the need for the
prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth Amendment's privilege against
self-incrimination. We decline to place officers such as Officer
Kraft in the untenable situation of having to consider, often in a
matter of seconds, whether it best serves society for them to ask the
necessary questions without the Miranda warnings and render
whatever probative evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them
to give the warnings in order to preserve the admissibility of
evidence they might uncover but possibly damage or destroy their
ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the volatile situation
confronting them.
Quarks, 467 U.S. at 657-58. The Court expressly rejected the suggestion that the
suspect's response, "the gun is over there," might be suppressed under Miranda, while
permitting admission of the pistol: "[W]e do not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings
of Miranda require us to exclude the evidence, thus penalizing officers for asking the
very questions which are the most crucial to their efforts to protect themselves and the
public." Id. at 658 n.7; see also id. at 659.
The Quarles opinion reveals two elements comprising die public safety
exception to the Miranda rule. First, the statement in issue must not be coerced, which
would amount to a Fifth Amendment violation. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654. Second, the
officer's questioning must be supported by an actual, immediate danger to safety. Id. at
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657. Further, the question whether these elements are satisfied "does not depend on the
motivation of the individual officers involved." Id. at 656.
Both public safety elements were present in this case. First, as happened in
Quarks, 467 U.S. at 654, Montoya makes no claim that his admission to ingesting heroin
was "actually compelled by police conduct which overcame his will to resist." Indeed,
Montoya was confronted by significantly less coercive police conduct than occurred in
Quarks, where the suspect was stopped at gunpoint, and then "surrounded by at least four
police officers and was handcuffed when the questioning at issue took place." 467 U.S. at
655. No guns were pointed at Montoya, only three officers were involved, and at least
one of those officers was evidently occupied with the Mitsubishi when McCarthy
questioned Montoya. Cf. United States v. Padilla, 819 F.2d 952,960-61 (10th Cir. 1987)
(suspect had been arrested at shotgun-point, was spread-eagled on ground when
questioning occurred; Quarks public safety exception applied).
Second, a real threat to Montoya's safety was present. As explained in
Point One (pages 22-23) of this brief, Montoya was badly intoxicated, apparently from
intravenous drug ingestion, and his condition appeared to be deteriorating when Officer
McCarthy spoke to him. Under these circumstances, it would have been irresponsible for
McCarthy to preface his query about heroin use with Miranda warnings, because giving
those warnings could have deterred Montoyafromproviding information that was needed
to preserve his own safety. See Quarks, 467 U.S. at 657. Even a delay in admitting his
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heroin ingestion, to ponder his Miranda options, could have compromised Montoya's
safety, by delaying treatment.
Montoya himself was part of the "public" involved in the "public safety"
exception to the Miranda rule. In State v. Franks, 119 N.M. 174, 889 P.2d 209 (N.M.
App. 1994), the New Mexico Court of Appeals followed Quarles in approving officer
questioning, not preceded by Miranda warnings, of a person who had reported his own
drug overdose: "When officers respond to a medical emergency and find the victim in
such a state that he or she may be unable to communicate later with medical personnel,
the officers have a duty to obtain as much information as they can concerning the
medically relevant cause of the victim's condition." 889 P.2d at 214. In this case, Officer
McCarty had a similar duty toward Montoya, who then received medical treatment for his
apparent heroin overdose (R. 135-36).7
In sum, the record clearly demonstrates that McCarthy properly asked
Montoya about heroin use, without first administering Miranda warnings. The "public
safety" exception to the Miranda rule justified that question. Accordingly, this Court
should affirm the denial of Montoya's motion to suppress his response.

Additionally, Montoya's extreme intoxication, and disorganized thinking caused
thereby, suggests that giving Miranda warnings would have merely confused him.
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CONCLUSION
The automobile driven by Montoya was properly searched, and he was
properly questioned about heroin use at the scene of his arrest. For these reasons,
Montoya's plea-supported conviction for heroin possession should be AFFIRMED.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JjU_ day of October, 1996.
JAN GRAHAM
Utah Attorney General

J. KEVIN MURPHY
Assistant Attorney General
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 951900016 FS
RANDY MONTOYA,
Judge J. Dennis Frederick
Defendant.
The above entitled matter came on for hearing on the 6th
day of February, 1995, on the Defendant's Motion to Suppress, the
Defendant being present and represented by David W. Brown and the
State of Utah represented by Richard S. Shepherd.

Testimony was

taken from Defendant and West Valley Police Officers Paul Gill,
James Schmidt and William McCarthy.

Following the taking of

evidence, the matter was argued both on the facts and the law by
both counsel for the Defendant and counsel for the State.

The

Court having heard the evidence and argument and being fully
advised

in

the

premises makes

these

Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
On August 24, 1994, at 3:07 A.M., West Valley Police
Officers Gill and Schmidt responded to a call at a Seven-Eleven
Store located at 4600 South 4000 West. Upon arriving at the scene

00OG5O

they found the Defendant, Randy J. Montoya, in the parking lot of
the store*

The Defendant was wearing only boxer shorts and

sandals. He was walking about in a nervous manner. His movements
were "jerky."

His behavior was erratic.

He was talking to

himself.
After observing the Defendant the officer came to the
conclusion that the Defendant was under the influence of some
drugs, and potentially a danger to himself or others.

He was

placed under arrest and handcuffs were placed on him.

When

questioned by Officer Gill, Defendant said he had consumed alcohol
and smoked a "joint."
Officers Gill and Schmidt prepared to impound the car
inasmuch as the driver was under arrest.

They began an inventory

search. They did not use an inventory or impound form. Inside the
vehicle between the seats Officer Gill found a hypodermic needle
and a spoon. Money was found scattered on the floor. The officers
called for assistance from Officer McCarthy.
Officer McCarthy, who was the supervising officer and
also an expert in narcotics matters, came to the scene.

He

observed the Defendant. He saw that he was frothing at the mouth,
his eyes were dilated and there appeared to be fresh needle marks
on his arms.

Officer McCarthy, based upon his prior experience,

believed the Defendant had ingested drugs. He was afraid that the
Defendant may have overdosed.

Medical help was called, and

eventually the Defendant was taken to the hospital.
Officer McCarthy looked in the trunk area of the car. In
the area under the spare tire he found five containers containing
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a substance that he believed to be black tar heroin.
Officer McCarthy testified that he determined that the
car that the Defendant had driven was in fact owned by someone
other than the Defendant, and that the owner was a person with whom
he was acquainted. He testified that as the supervising officer he
decided not to impound the car, but to notify the real owner. The
decision not to impound was made after the drugs were found.

He

testified that the car was a new car with a large lien, that would
not be a likely prospect for forfeiture, and further that he wished
to save the owner cost and inconvenience. The car was returned to
the owner.

At the time McCarthy returned the car, he asked to

search the apartment of the vehicle's owner, Shannon Pina.

She

refused to consent to the search.
He

further

testified

that

the West Valley

impound

procedure, which he assisted in formulating, provides that a
special inventory list was not necessary in all circumstances. In
some circumstances the contents of the car could be noted in the
police report. The officers had considerable discretion in how to
proceed.

He further testified that an inventory list was not

prepared in this case, but that the money, needle, spoon and heroin
removed from the car were noted in the police report.

No other

contents of the car were noted in the police report.
The
intoxicated.

Defendant

testified

that

he

was

not

in

fact

He admitted that he had in fact used heroin earlier,

and that he was taken to the hospital where he was treated for the
effects of that drug.

Defendant testified that the vehicle was

searched two times, the items being seized on the second search.
3

COECfrVSIPHS OF IAW
The Court finds that the testimony of the officers was
credible.

There was a legitimate basis for the arrest.

lawful arrest.

It was a

There were no incriminating statements made after

the arrest.
After the arrest it was reasonable to begin impoundment
procedures, the car could not be left in the parking lot at 3:00
A.M.

Examination of the car preparatory to impoundment

was

according to procedures. The fact that an inventory sheet was not
used was not fatal. The process was interrupted by the supervising
officer's decision to return the car to its rightful owner.

The

search was not inappropriate, it was part of legitimate steps taken
in the process of impoundment, which process was interrupted by the
decision of Officer McCarthy.
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
concludes that Defendant's Motion to Suppress is denied.
DATED

this

VWra
ay of March, 1995.
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed,
postage prepaid, this ifron day of March, 1995, to the following:
Richard S. Shepherd
Deputy District Attorney
2001 South State Street, #S3700
Salt Lake City, UT 84190-1200
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